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The Shadow of Westphalia: Majoritarian
Religions and Strasbourg Law
Mark Weston Janis*
ABSTRACT
Throughout Europe, religious majoritarian cultures have been traditionally hostile to
minority faiths. The European Court of Human Rights has been slow to apply Article
9, religious tolerance. Albeit, today it is generally accepted that no one religion is
destined to become the common faith of Europe, it is still very difﬁcult in European
law and politics to say how much each of the 47 Member States of the states of the
Council of Europe should be permitted to restrict religious liberty domestically to
protect and nurture a majoritarian faith, especially a majoritarian Christian faith.
Europe, in many ways, is still in the shadow of the Peace of Westphalia, promoting
intra-European peace by permitting the Continent’s states to adopt, if they wish, their
own national visions of a Christian society.

1. INTRODUCTION
Religious freedom may be the oldest as well as the most problematic human right.
The notion of religious freedom conflates the rights of individuals with the rights of
religious communities, a duality that often results in tension and conflict. Religious
freedom, if established for a majority religion, often results in limitations being
imposed on the religious freedom of minority faiths. A majoritarian religious community may, in the name of its communal religious freedom, suppress the individual
religious freedom of an adherent who seeks to leave them for a new faith or for no
religion at all. A majoritarian religion, again exercising its religious freedom, may
enlist the state both to support it and to repress minority denominations.
Europe traditionally has not been friendly to religious toleration. From the
Roman Empire to our times, the Continent has witnessed one after another fierce
religious struggle. The Romans at first suppressed Christianity. Christianity, once
adopted by the Empire, dissolved into 1700 years of doctrinal and physical clashes,
including the 11th-century schism between Rome in the Catholic West and
Constantinople in the Orthodox East, and the fierce 16th- and 17th-century Western
rivalry between Rome and dissenting Protestants. In the 20th century, religious
bigotry contributed to the slaughter of six million European Jews. Today, religion
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2. WESTPHALIA
Famously, the Peace of Westphalia (1648) settled Europe’s 30 Years War
(1618–48). Some even date the beginning of the modern international political system from the Westphalian Peace, since it tolled the bell both on the Catholic
Church’s pretension to be the common faith of Western Europe and on the
Emperor’s prerogative to intervene in the domestic affairs of the Empire’s many
polities. Indeed, the very term ‘“Westphalia” is often used as shorthand for a system
of equal and sovereign states; the peace treaties of Westphalia . . . are sometimes said
to have established the modern concept of sovereign statehood.’2 Whatever the

1 Kokkinakis v Greece, Application no 14307/88 (25 May 1993).
2 Benjaman Straumann, ‘The Peace of Westphalia as a Secular Constitution’ (2008) 15(2) Constellations
173.
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still divides Europe’s nations. There is a widespread intolerance of Islam, a re-emergence of anti-semitism, and heavily majoritarian cultures, often hostile to minority
faiths, all over.
Promoting religious freedom in Europe has been an assigned task, inter alia, of
the Council of Europe and the European Convention on the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the ECHR), especially its Article 9: freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion. The ECHR establishes the European Court of
Human Rights (the Strasbourg Court) to which individuals and groups of individuals
may complain about state infringements of their ECHR rights. Tellingly, the
Strasbourg Court was extraordinarily late to turn to Article 9. Only in 1993, long
after its consideration of other substantive human rights, did the Strasbourg Court
deliver its first Article 9 judgment, Kokkinakis v Greece.1 In Kokkinakis, the court held
that Greece had infringed a Jehovah Witness’s religious freedom by jailing and fining
him for trying to convert majoritarian Greek Orthodox adherents to his minority
faith.
For the two decades after Kokkinakis, the Strasbourg Court has had very little success in charting a steady course for the interpretation and application of Article 9. It
is a commonplace to remark that the court’s case law on religious freedom is inconsistent. Critics have battered the Strasbourg Court not only for its vagaries, but for
being either too soft or too hard in limiting exercises of state power vis-à-vis personal
religious rights. This article enters the fray, exploring one aspect of the court’s case
law and the critical commentary about it: the court’s response to cases, like
Kokkinakis, featuring a complaint about a state’s promotion of majoritarian beliefs.
I argue that the court’s weakness in defining a proper relationship between a state
and a majoritarian religious approach reflects a deep-seated European uneasiness
about how far to tolerate religious diversity. While it is generally accepted today that
no one religion is destined to become the common faith of Europe, a beneficial outcome of the Peace of Westphalia, it is still very difficult both in European law and in
European politics to say what measures each of the 47 Member States of the Council
of Europe may take to protect and nurture majoritarian beliefs, especially a majoritarian Christian faith. This I term the troubling ‘shadow of Westphalia.’

The Shadow of Westphalia
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Now whereas the Grievances of the one and the other Religion, which were
debated amongst the Electors, Princes and States of the [Holy Roman]
Empire, have been partly the Cause and Occasion of the present war, it has
been agreed . . . that there be an exact and reciprocal Equality amongst all the
Electors, Princes and States of both religions.8
Henceforward, each sovereign state could establish, free of outside influence,
including that of the Emperor, its own national faith. However, the Treaty’s guarantees of religious toleration of dissenting faiths within each state were far less definitive. The exact language of the Treaty concerning internal religious toleration
provided:
It has moreover been found good, that those of the Confession of Augsburg
[Protestants], who are Subjects of the Catholicks, and the Catholick Subjects
of the States of the Confession of Augsburg, who had not the public or private
Exercise of their religion in any time of the year 1624 and who after the
Publication of the Peace shall possess and embrace a Religion different from
that of the Lord of the Territory, shall in consequence of the said Peace be
patiently suffer’d and tolerated, without any Hindrance or Impediment to attend their Devotions in their Houses and in private, with all Liberty of
Conscience, and without any Inquisition or Trouble, and even to assist in their
Neighborhood, as often as they have a mind, at the publick Exercise of their
Religion, or have them instructed in their Families by private Masters; provided the said Vassals and Subjects do their Duty in all other things, and hold
3 ibid 173–74.
4 CG Roelofsen, ‘The Netherlands Until 1813: International Aspects’ in HF van Panhuys and others (eds),
International Law in the Netherlands (Sijthoff & Noordhoff 1978) 3, 13.
5 Norman Bentwich, The Religious Foundations of Internationalism (2nd edn G. Allen & Unwin, 1959) 122.
6 Jonathan Havercroft, ‘Was Westphalia “All That”? Hobbes, Bellarmine and the Norm of NonInternvention’ (2010) 1 Global Consitutionalism 120, 120.
7 Pacem in Terris: Encyclical of Pope John XXIII on Establishing Universal Peace in Truth, Justice, Charity, and
Liberty, 11 April 11963.
8 1 Consolidated Treaty Series 198, art V (1).
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adequacy of ‘Westphalia’ to denote the modern international political system,3 there
is little doubt that some political entities, notably the Netherlands, achieved their formal sovereign status at Westphalia in 1648.4
The Catholic Church repudiated the Peace of Westphalia.5 Pope Innocent X
judged Westphalia ‘null, void, invalid, iniquitous, unjust, damnable, reprobate, inane,
and devoid of all meaning for all time’.6 Though the Catholic church did not concede
the Treaty’s religious authority until the 20th century,7 the Empire and the states
concluding the Peace of Westphalia did in 1648 answer more or less conclusively
one of the key questions of religious conflict: the right of each sovereign to establish
a national Christian confession, whether it be Catholic or Protestant.
As set forth in Article V in one of the Treaty’s two forms, the Treaty of
Osnabrück of 24 October 1648:
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Professor Bhuta describes Westphalia’s approach to religious toleration: ‘The state
is far from neutral about religious doctrine and practice in general, but the strategy of
toleration in which certain doctrines previously vilified as heretical are treated instead
as not threatening to public order provided they remain in their proper place.’10 He
argues that, rather than springing from Westphalia, the broader notion of a legal right
to personal religious toleration finds its source in other traditions, perhaps the North
American experience, first in the English colonial charters, then in state and US declarations of rights between 1776 and 1789.11
3 . A R TI C LE 9
The wording of Article 9 in the 1950 ECHR was immediately drawn from Article 18
of the United Nations’ 1949 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.12 In turn, the
UN Universal Declaration was based upon national traditions of human rights, for
example, Magna Carta (1215) in England, the Declaration of Independence (1776)
and the Bill of Rights (1789) in the USA, and the Declaration of the Rights of Man
and Citizen (1789) in France.13
Article 9 provides:

i. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice, and observance.
ii. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic

9 ibid, art V (28).
10 Nehal Bhuta, ‘Two Concepts of Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2012)
EUI Working Paper 2012/33, 4, papers.ssrn.com, accessed 31 December 2014.
11 ibid 5.
12 Art 9 in turn was reflected later in art 10 of the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights. Tania
Groppi, ‘Article 10 – Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion’ in William BT Mock and others
(eds), Human Rights in Europe: Commentary on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
(Carolina Academic Press 2010) 64.
13 Mark W Janis, Richard S Kay and Anthony W Bradley, European Human Rights Law (3rd edn Oxford
University Press, 2008) 4–12.
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themselves in due Obedience and Subjection, without giving occasion to any
Disturbance or Commotion. In like manner Subjects, whether they be
Catholicks, or of the Confession of Augsburg, shall not be despis’d any where
upon account of their Religion, nor excluded from the Community of
Merchants, Artizans or Companies, nor depriv’d of Successions, Legacies,
Hospitals, Laza-Houses, or Alms-Houses, and other Privileges or Rights, and
far less of Church-yards, and the Honour of Burial; not shall any more be
exacted of them for the Expence of their Funerals, than the Dues usually paid
for Burying-Parish-Churches; so that in these and all other the like things they
shall be treated in the same manner as Brethren and Sisters, with equal justice
and protection.9

The Shadow of Westphalia
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It was probably the sensitivity of religious issues that long chilled any ardour that
the European Court of Human Rights might have had to address cases involving
Article 9. As late as 1993, 43 years after the treaty’s conclusion and after almost four
decades of contentious cases about other ECHR articles decided by the court,
Malcolm Shaw, just before Kokkinakis, lamented that the Strasbourg Court had up to
then never delivered an Article 9 judgment:
It is to be profoundly hoped that as the century comes to a close and the
process of integration in Europe both deepens and widens throughout the
continent that the Convention system will be able to play its part through an
interpretation of Article 9 and other provisions in mitigating the rising problems of intolerance and discrimination.14
Shaw’s hopes were soon satisfied in Kokkinakis, but only to a degree. Though
Kokkinakis has passed from being simply one Strasbourg Court case among many into
becoming ‘the’ symbol of what European human rights law ought to do for religious
freedom, when one looks at the subsequent case law, one sees the promise of Kokkinakis
much overshadowed. Let us begin with the by-now familiar story of Kokkinakis.

A. Kokkinakis
Mr Minos Kokkinakis, a convert to the Jehovah’s Witness faith, had been arrested
more than 60 times for proselytism and had been already fined and imprisoned by
the Greek government. The judgment of the court summarized the facts:
On 2 March 1986 [Mr Kokkinakis] and his wife called at the home of
Mrs. Kyriakaki in Sitia and engaged in a discussion with her. Mrs. Kyriakaki’s
husband, who was the cantor at a local Orthodox church, informed the police,
who arrested Mr. and Mrs Kokkinakis and took them to the local police station, where they spent the night of 2-3 March 1986 . . . . [The defendants],
who belong to the Jehovah’s Witnesses sect, attempted to proselytize and, directly or indirectly, to intrude on the religious beliefs of Orthodox Christians,
with the intention of undermining their beliefs, by taking advantage of their inexperience, their low intellect and their naivety. In particular, they went to the
home of [Mrs Kyriakaki] . . . and told her that they brought good news; by
insisting in a pressing manner, they gained admittance to the house and began
to read from a book on the Scriptures which they interpreted with reference to
a king of heaven, to events which had not yet occurred but would occur, etc,
encouraging her by means of their judicious, skilful explanations . . . to change
her Orthodox Christian beliefs.

14 Malcolm N Shaw, ‘Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion’ in Macdonald, Matscher and Petzold
(eds), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights (Kluwer Law International 1993) 445, 468.
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society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order,
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
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The penal sentence against Mr Kokkinakis was upheld, although reduced, by the
Greek Court of Appeal and Court of Cassation. Domestic remedies exhausted,
Mr Kokkinakis complained to Strasbourg. The judgment came down on 25 May
1993, the Strasbourg Court noting that the Greek government had long suppressed
proselytism, ruled:
As enshrined in Article 9, freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one
of the foundations of a ‘democratic society’ within the meaning of the
Convention. It is, in its religious dimension, one of the most vital elements
that go to make up the identity of believers and their conception of life, but it
is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned.
The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly
won over the centuries, depends on it.
While religious freedom is primarily a matter of individual conscience,
it also implies, inter alia, freedom to ‘manifest [one’s] religion.’ Bearing witness
in words and deeds is bound up with the existence of religious convictions.
According to Article 9, freedom to manifest one’s religion is not only exercisable in community with others, ‘in public’ and within the circle of those whose
faith one shares, but can also be asserted ‘alone’ and ‘in private’; furthermore, it
includes in principle the right to try to convince one’s neighbour, for example
through ‘teaching’, failing which, moreover, ‘freedom to change [one’s] religion
or belief, enshrined in Article 9, would be likely to remain a dead letter.
Greece was and is not alone among European states in establishing a majoritarian
church. Although the exact relationship may differ, at least a dozen European states,
formally establish a religion: Andorra—the Roman Catholic Church (Article 11 of the
Constitution); Armenia—the Armenian Apostolic Church (the 1991 law on Freedom
of Conscience and on Religious Organization); Denmark—the Danish Lutheran
Church (section 4 of the Kingdom’s Constitutional Act); UK—the Church of
England (Toleration Act 1689, 1 William and Mary, chapter 13) and the Church of
Scotland (Church of Scotland Act, 1921, 11 and 12 Geo 5, chapter 29); Finland—the
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland and the Finnish Orthodox Church (Article 76
of the Constitution); Georgia—the Georgian Orthodox Church (Article 9 of the
Constitution); Iceland—Icelandic Lutheran Church (Article 62 of the Constitution);
Liechtenstein—the Roman Catholic Church (Article 37 of the Constitution), Malta—
the Roman Catholic Church (section 2 of the Constitution); Monaco—the Roman
Catholic Church (Article 9 of the Constitution); and Norway—Norwegian Lutheran
Church (Article 2 of the Constitution).
This wide tradition of established churches helps explain why it took so long for
the Strasbourg Court to apply Article 9 to limit a state’s repression of a minority
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The court found Mr and Mrs Kokkinakis guilty of proselytism and sentenced each of them to four months’ imprisonment, convertible into a pecuniary penalty of 400 drachmas per day’s imprisonment, and a fine of 10,000
drachmas.

The Shadow of Westphalia
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B. Otto-Preminger
Just the year after Kokkinakis the Strasbourg Court abruptly changed course, employing Article 9, not to protect, but to repress a minority challenge to a majoritarian
church. In Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria, the court shielded the majoritarian
Catholic community from criticism which might otherwise have been allowed under
Article 10 which protects the individual’s right of freedom of expression.18 Here are
some of the facts as put by the court:
The applicant, Otto-Preminger-lnstitut für audiovisuelle Mediengesialtung
(OPI), a private association under Austrian law established in
Innsbruck[,] . . . announced a series of six showings, which would be accessible
to the general public, of the film ‘Das Liebeskonzil’ (Council in Heaven) by
Werner Schroeter. [An] announcement was . . . worded as follows:
Oskar Panizza’s satirical tragedy set in Heaven was filmed by Schroeter from
a performance by the Teatro Belli in Rome and set in the context of a reconstruction of the writer’s trial and conviction in 1895 for blasphemy. Panizza
starts from the assumption that syphilis was God’s punishment for man’s fornication and sinfulness at the time of the Renaissance, especially at the court of
the Borgia Pope Alexander VI in Schroeters film, God’s representatives on
Earth carrying the insignia of worldly power resemble the heavenly
protagonists.
Trivial imagery and absurdities of the Christian creed are targeted in a caricatural mode and the relationship between religious beliefs and worldly mechanisms of oppression is investigated.
***
At the request of the Innsbruck diocese of the Roman Catholic Church, the
Public Prosecutor instituted criminal proceedings against OPI’s manager,
Mr Dietmar Zingl, on 10 May 1985. The charge was ‘disparaging religious doctrines,’ . . . an act prohibited by section 188 of the [Austrian] Penal Code.
15 Donna Gomien, Short Guide to the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe 1991) 69.
16 Mark W Janis, ‘Introduction’ in Mark W Janis and Carolyn Evans (eds), Religion and International Law
(Martinus Nijhoff 2004) xiii.
17 John Hedigan, ‘Religious Advertising and the European Convention of Human Rights, Congrès des
Droits de l’Homme, Istanbul, 16-19 May 2006,’ European Court of Human Rights, Doc No 100042.
18 Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria, Application no 13470/87 (20 September 1994).
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religious view. In 1991, two years before Kokkinakis, one commentator gently suggested another reason for the court’s failure up to then to find a breach of Article 9:
‘because the rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion are largely exercised inside an individual’s heart and mind’.15 It may also be that many of the judges
on the European Court of Human Rights were uneasy with religious questions, a
sentiment prevalent among modern international lawyers.16 As one recent
Strasbourg judge, Ireland’s John Hedigan, admitted only a few years ago: ‘In matters
pertaining to religion, it is perhaps better not to stray too far from home.’17
Whatever the cause, despite Kokkinakis, the reluctance to interfere with majoritarian
religious views lingers.
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The Court cannot disregard the fact that the Roman Catholic religion is the
religion of the overwhelming majority of Tyroleans. In seizing the film, the
Austrian authorities acted to ensure religious peace in that region and to prevent that some people should feel the object of attacks on their religious beliefs
in an unwarranted and offensive manner. It is the first place for the national
authorities, who are better placed than the international judge, to assess the
need for such a measure in the light of the situation obtaining locally at a given
time. In all the circumstances of the present case, the court does not consider
that the Austrian authorities can be regarded as having overstepped their margin of appreciation in this respect.
Tellingly, the court had turned Article 9 and Kokkinakis around on their heads.
Rather than being used to protect minority expression, Article 9 was now being
employed to safeguard majority religious sentiment. Immediately after OttoPreminger, Jeremy Gunn lamented ‘the failure of the European Court to take seriously rights of conscience in its jurisprudence’.19 Gunn saw three weaknesses in the
court’s approach: a ‘failure to require governments to impose less restrictive burdens
on manifestations of conscience’, a ‘bias against nontraditional religions’, and a ‘deference to state-established religions’.20 Tad Stahnke defended the holding in
Otto-Preminger, arguing that ‘it was the manner in which the message was delivered,
and not the content of the message, that implicated a restriction on the freedom to
deliver it’.21 A more critical observer, Jonatus Machado, submitted that the OttoPreminger court ‘overlook[ed] a violation of the right to freedom of speech’ . . . ‘the
Court failed to give due weight to the notion that freedom of speech must be interpreted in a way that protects shocking, offensive and provocative speech – a notion
to which the Court subscribes – including those that promote discourse critical of
religion, even (and especially) the dominant religion’.22
The Otto-Preminger court apparently concluded that Article 9 guarantees a right
for a majoritarian religion to be, in some circumstances, sheltered from criticism. But
is this right? Was not Article 9 intended to limit governmental abuses of religious
freedom, rather than restrict individual religious expression? An ‘unsatisfactory’ result
of Otto-Preminger was that it viewed Article 9 as imposing ‘a positive obligation to
ensure the peaceful enjoyment’ of ‘religion’.23 As Jeroen Temperman put it in his
19 T Jeremy Gunn, ‘Adjudicating Rights of Conscience Under the European Convention on Human Rights’
in Johan D van Vyver and John Witte Jr (eds), Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective: Legal
Perspectives (Martinus Nijhoff 1996) 305, 325.
20 ibid.
21 Tad Stahnke, ‘Proselytism and the Freedom to Change Religion in International Human Rights Law’
(1999) BYU L Rev 251, 297.
22 Jonatas EM Machado, ‘Freedom of Religion: A View from Europe’ (2005) 10 Roger Williams U L Rev
451, 505–06.
23 Richard Clayton and Hugh Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights (OUP 2000) 976.
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The Prosecutor prohibited the public showing of the film. The film was seized by
the state. In upholding these acts, the Strasbourg Court emphasized the importance
of the majoritarian faith in the region:

The Shadow of Westphalia
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The Otto-Preminger case seems to indicate that freedom of expression will
give way to the freedom of majority religious beliefs. This appears to be at
odds with the emphasis that the Court has placed on the pluralism in a democratic society of religious belief encompassing skepticism and agnosticism,
which was demonstrated, for example, in the Kokkinakis case.25

C. Murphy
More of the same followed in Murphy v Ireland, decided in 2003.26 Following along the
path of Otto-Preminger, the Murphy Court saw Article 9 as a means by which to protect a
majoritarian religion and to limit both the Article 9 and the Article 10 rights of a minority.
[Murphy] is a pastor attached to the Irish Faith Centre, a bible based
[Protestant] Christian ministry in Dublin. In early 1995 the Irish Faith Centre
submitted an advertisement to an independent, local and commercial radio
station for transmission. The text of the advertisement read as follows:
‘What think ye of Christ? Would you, like Peter, only say that he is the son of
the living God? Have you ever exposed yourself to the historical facts about
Christ? The Irish Faith Centre are presenting for Easter week an hour-long
video by Dr. Jean Scott PhD on the evidence of the resurrection from Monday
10-Saturday 15, April every night at 8.30 and Easter Sunday at 11.30am and
also live by satellite at 7.30pm.’
The radio station was prepared to broadcast the advertisement. However, in
March 1995 the Independent Radio and Television Commission (‘IRTC’)
stopped the broadcast pursuant to s 10(3) of the Radio and Television Act
1988 (‘the 1988 Act’).
***
[In 1997,] the [Irish] High Court found that the IRTC had not infringed
s. 10(3) of the 1988 Act. It further considered that the unspecified right to
communicate guaranteed by Art. 40(3) (1) of the Constitution was at issue
since the advertisement had, as its principal purpose, the communication of
information. However, it found that s. 10(3) was a reasonable limitation on
the right to communicate and that there were good reasons in the public
24 Jeroen Temperman, ‘Protection Against Religious Hatred under the United Nations ICCPR and the
European Convention System’ in S Ferrari and R Cristofori (eds), Law and Religion in the 21st Century:
Relations between States and Religious Communities (2010) 215, 216.
25 Willi Furhmann, ‘Perspective on Religious Freedom from the Vantage Point of the European Court of
Human Rights’ (2000) BYUL Rev 829, 837.
26 Murphy v Ireland, Application no 44179/98 (10 July 2003).
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critique of Otto-Preminger: ‘the Court fails to distinguish between forms of criticism
or insult that do actually jeopardize the rights and freedoms of others, and forms of
defamation that – although perhaps deplorable in a “moral sense” – do not’.24
A Strasbourg judge, Willi Fuhrmann, suggested that:

84



Oxford Journal of Law and Religion

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ojlr/article/4/1/75/1427610 by University of Connecticut School of Law Library user on 19 August 2022

interest for the ban. [In 1998, the Irish Supreme Court rejected the appeal of
the applicant who then applied to Strasbourg.]
The [Strasbourg] Court recalls that freedom of expression constitutes one
of the essential foundations of a democratic society. As para. 2 of Art. 10
expressly recognises, however, the exercise of that freedom carries with it
duties and responsibilities. Amongst them, in the context of religious beliefs, is
the general requirement to ensure the peaceful enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under Art. 9 to the holders of such beliefs including a duty to avoid as far
as possible an expression that is, in regard to objects of veneration, gratuitously
offensive to others and profane.
[T]here is little scope under Art. 10(2) of the Convention for restrictions
on political speech or on debate of questions of public interest. However, a
wider margin of appreciation is generally available to the Contracting States
when regulating freedom of expression in relation to matters liable to offend
intimate personal convictions within the sphere of morals or, especially, religion. Moreover, as in the field of morals, and perhaps to an even greater degree, there is no uniform European conception of the requirements of ‘the protection of the rights of others’ in relation to attacks on their religious
convictions. What is likely to cause substantial offence to persons of a particular religious persuasion will vary significantly from time to time and from place
to place, especially in an era characterised by an ever-growing array of faiths
and denominations. By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the
vital forces of their countries, State authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of
these requirements with regard to the rights of others as well as on the ‘necessity’ of a ‘restriction’ intended to protect from such material those whose deepest feelings and convictions would be seriously offended.
***
[T]he domestic courts found that the Government was entitled to be prudent in this context. In particular, the High Court considered relevant the fact
that religion had been a divisive issue in Northern Ireland. It further considered that Irish people with religious beliefs tended to belong to a particular
church so that religious advertising from a different church might be considered offensive and open to the interpretation of proselytism. Indeed, the
High Court pointed out that it was the very fact that an advertisement was directed towards a religious end which might have been potentially offensive to
the public. The Supreme Court also emphasised that the three subjects highlighted by s. 10(3) of the 1988 Act concerned subjects which had proven ‘extremely divisive in Irish society in the past’ and it also agreed that the
Government had been entitled to take the view that Irish citizens would resent
having advertisements touching on these topics broadcast into their homes
and that such advertisements could lead to unrest.
***
In the circumstances, and given the margin of appreciation accorded to the
State in such matters, the Court considers that the State has demonstrated that

The Shadow of Westphalia
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The Strasbourg Court found unanimously that there was no violation of Article
10. Like Otto-Preminger, Murphy repudiated Kokkinakis. Why if Jehovah’s Witnesses
were protected by the Convention to go door to door, probably offending the dominant Orthodox majority in Greece, may not Protestants go on the air, probably offending the dominant Catholic majority in Ireland, or religious sceptics challenge the
premises of Christianity? As Professor Johan van der Vyer pointed out, ‘controversies
centered upon the right to spread one’s faith and the right to convert others remain
a stumbling block in efforts to establish universal respect for, and adherence to, the
vital components of religious freedom as contemplated by the founders of the
United Nations.’27
Did the court fail to pay adequate attention to Article 9 rights in Murphy? Take,
for example, this passage:
[T]here is little scope under Art. 10(2) of the Convention for restrictions on
political speech or on debate of questions of public interest. However, a wider
margin of appreciation is generally available to the Contracting States when
regulating matters liable to offend intimate personal convictions within the
sphere of morals or, especially, religion.
In a critique, Jeroen Temperman wondered why the Murphy Court did not discuss
whether the facts of the case supported a conclusion that the advertisement was
offensive ‘and, if so, whether the expression (the radio commercial) was likely to
have led to instances of discrimination on grounds of religion or other violations of
religious rights’.28
Note the Strasbourg Court here does not even attempt to balance Article 9 and
Article 10 freedoms; it simply disregards Article 9 rights altogether. It seems that
Murphy understands manifesting one’s religion more as a problem of freedom of
expression than as an issue of freedom of religion. However, the Irish judge then in
Strasbourg, John Hedigan, employed Murphy as his principal example when exploring Article 9 at a conference. He explained, ‘the reason I have chosen this case is
because although decided under Article 10 and the right to communicate, to receive
and impart information, the rationale of the decision relates in great part to matters
arising under Article 9 and how Governments deal with conflicting interests
thereunder.’29
The Strasbourg Court, retreating from Kokkinakis, was reluctant to apply Article 9
in Murphy, holding ‘there is no uniform European conception of the requirements of
the protection of the rights of others in relation to attacks on their religious convictions’, and arguing that it was up to the states, not Strasbourg, to decide the proper
27 Johan D van der Vyver, ‘Limitations of Freedom of Religion or Belief: International Perspectives’ (2005)
19 Emory Int’l L Rev 499, 502.
28 Temperman (n 24) 219.
29 Hedigan (n 17).
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there were ‘relevant and sufficient’ reasons justifying the interference with the
applicant’s freedom of expression within the meaning of Art. 10 of the
Convention.
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It is very difficult to explain to states that they are, on the one hand, bound to
strive for religious toleration and pluralism through a policy of strict neutrality
between all forms of religion and belief whilst at the same time insisting that it
is quite legitimate for the state to prohibit public forms of religious manifestation which the state considers to undermine the essential political foundations
when many consider those foundations to be religious.32
‘[T]here appears to be a danger that it is the interests of the state which are
now assuming a clear priority as against the religious rights of individuals and
communities – and this is not what human rights protections are meant to be
about.’33
In a like manner, Niraj Nathwani observed that the Strasbourg Court read into
these religion cases, ‘a right to be protected in their religious feelings’.34 However,
this protection was extended only to protect ‘majority religions; [although] [m]inority religions, especially those religions that are associated with ethnic minorities,
need protection much more than majority religions’.35 Nathwani argued, ‘Adherents
of majority religions have to accept that freedom of expression extends to all expressions, including those that offend, shock and disturb.’36

30 Malcolm D Evans, ‘Freedom of Religion and the European Convention on Human Rights: Approaches,
Trends and Tensions’ in Cane, Evans and Robinson (eds), Law and Religion in Theoretical and Historical
Context (Cambridge University Press 2008) 291.
31 ibid 312.
32 ibid 312–13.
33 ibid 315.
34 Niraj Nathwani, ‘Religious Cartoons and Human Rights – A Critical Legal Analysis of the Case Law of
the European Court of Human Rights on the Protection of Religious Feelings and its Implications in the
Danish Affair Concerning Cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad’ (2008) 13 European Human Rights Law
Review 488, 503–04.
35 ibid 504
36 ibid 506.
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limits on manifestations of religion. But is not the role of the court to fashion common European standards of human rights? A common strand in Otto-Preminger and
Murphy is that the court employed the margin of appreciation to give the defendant
states—Austria and Ireland—the discretion to limit manifestations of religion
according to national rather than European conceptions. This deference by
Strasbourg helps explain the court’s decisions to treat both as non-Article 9 cases,
focusing instead on Article 10. Indeed, as we see, Article 9 was used by the court
counter-textually to justify a limit on individual religious rights.
Reflecting on cases like Otto-Preminger and Murphy, Malcolm Evans was rueful:
Strasbourg law ‘is as likely to hinder as it is to assist the realization of the goals of tolerance and religious pluralism which are said to be what it is seeking to achieve’.30
He complained that in ‘many states – like it or not – religious difference is seen as a
threat to public order’.31 Evans criticized the Strasbourg Court:

The Shadow of Westphalia



87

The Court further considers that the crucifix is above all a religious symbol.
The domestic courts came to the same conclusion and in any event the
Government have not contested this. The question whether the crucifix is
charged with any other meaning beyond its religious symbolism is not decisive
at this stage of the Court’s reasoning.
There is no evidence before the Court that the display of a religious symbol
on classroom walls may have an influence on pupils and so it cannot reasonably be asserted that it does or does not have an effect on young persons
whose convictions are still in the process of being formed.
However, it is understandable that the first applicant might see in the display
of crucifixes in the classrooms of the State school formerly attended by her
children a lack of respect on the State’s part for her right to ensure their education and teaching in conformity with her own philosophical convictions. Be
that as it may, the applicant’s subjective perception is not in itself sufficient to
establish a breach of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.
The Government, for their part, explained that the presence of crucifixes in
State-school classrooms, being the result of Italy’s historical development, a
fact which gave it not only a religious connotation but also an identity-linked
one, now corresponded to a tradition which they considered it important to
perpetuate. They added that, beyond its religious meaning, the crucifix symbolised the principles and values which formed the foundation of democracy and
western civilisation, and that its presence in classrooms was justifiable on that
account.
The Court takes the view that the decision whether or not to perpetuate a
tradition falls in principle within the margin of appreciation of the respondent
State. The Court must moreover take into account the fact that Europe is
marked by a great diversity between the States of which it is composed, particularly in the sphere of cultural and historical development.
***
The Court concludes in the present case that the decision whether crucifixes
should be present in State-school classrooms is, in principle, a matter falling
within the margin of appreciation of the respondent State. Moreover, the fact
37 Lautsi v Italy, Application no 30814/06 (Second Section, 13 November 2009).
38 Lautsi v Italy, Application no 30814/06 (Grand Chamber, 18 March 2011).
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D. Lautsi
For a brief moment, it seemed the Strasbourg Court might be returning to a
Kokkinakis-like perspective on minority challenges to majoritarian religions. In a
unanimous 2009 judgment, a seven-judge Strasbourg Court chamber in Lautsi
v Italy,37 held ‘that the presence of the crucifix in [Italian state] classrooms goes
beyond the use of symbols in specific historical contexts’. A non-believer ‘sees the
display of the crucifix as a sign that the state takes the side of Catholicism’. ‘The
State has a duty to uphold confessional neutrality in public education.’
However, after widespread protests in Italy, the court reversed itself as a 17-judge
Grand Chamber over-turned the Second Section’s Lautsi decision two years later:38
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that there is no European consensus on the question of the presence of
religious symbols in State schools speaks in favour of that approach.
***
[A] crucifix on a wall is an essentially passive symbol and this point is of
importance in the Court’s view, particularly having regard to the principle of
neutrality. It cannot be deemed to have an influencer on pupils comparable to
that of didactic speech or participation in religious activities.
The Court observes that, in its judgment of 3 November 2009, the Chamber
agreed with the submission that the display of crucifixes in classrooms would
have a significant impact on the second and third applicants, aged eleven and
thirteen at the time. The Chamber found that, in the context of public education, crucifixes, which it was impossible not to notice in classrooms, were
necessarily perceived as an integral part of the school environment and could
therefore be considered ‘powerful external symbols . . .’.
The Grand Chamber does not agree with that approach.
***
[T]he effects of the greater visibility which the presence of the crucifix gives
to Christianity in schools needs to be further placed in perspective by consideration of die following points. Firstly, the presence of crucifixes is not associated
with compulsory teaching about Christianity. Secondly, according to the indications provided by the Government, Italy opens up the school environment
in parallel to other religions. The Government indicated in this connection
that it was not forbidden for pupils to wear Islamic headscarves or other symbols or apparel having a religious connotation; alternative arrangements were
possible to help schooling fit in with non-majority religious practices; the
beginning and end of Ramadan were ‘often celebrated’ in schools; and
optional religious education could be organised in schools for ‘all recognised
religious creeds.’ Moreover, there was nothing to suggest that the authorities
were intolerant of pupils who believed in other religions, were non-believers or
who held non-religious philosophical convictions.
In addition, the applicants did not assert that the presence of the crucifix in
classrooms had encouraged the development of teaching practices with a proselytising tendency, or claim that the second and third applicants had ever experienced a tendentious reference to that presence by a teacher in the exercise of
his or her functions.
Lastly, the Court notes that the first applicant retained in full her right as a
parent to enlighten and advise her children, to exercise in their regard her natural functions as educator and to guide them on a path in line with her own
philosophical convictions. It follows from the foregoing that, in deciding to
keep crucifixes in the classrooms of the State school attended by the first applicant’s children, the authorities acted within the limits of the margin of appreciation left to the respondent State in the context of its obligation to respect, in
the exercise of the functions it assumes in relation to education and teaching.
the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with
their own religious and philosophical convictions.
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In the false spring between the Lautsi judgment of the Chamber and that of the
Grand Chamber, Zachary Calo attacked the Lautsi Chamber from a majoritarian religious perspective, arguing that the Chamber reflected a ‘Europe [that] has increasingly cut itself off from traditional religious beliefs and practices in a manner that has
left it a pervasively secular culture.’39 He believed that ‘the Court’s commitment to a
mode of secular logic has been particularly important in limiting its ability to render
decisions consistent with the principle of normative religious pluralism.’40 Hence,
the court was guilty of assuming that religion is ‘more a problem . . . than a solution’.41 Calo believed that modern human rights doctrine was at fault: ‘Human rights
drew upon inherited religious concepts and categories but was ultimately cut off
from any dependence on those religious foundations.’42 He concluded that ‘the problem with the secular tradition of human rights is not simply that it denies forms of
religious expression but that it cuts off human rights from their deepest source of
meaning.’43
At the same time, Susanna Mancini observed that ‘[i]t is curious that the Court
used the margin of appreciation to protect minorities when the majority religion happens to be Islam.’44 She contrasted the court’s headscarf cases with ‘all the cases such
as Otto Preminger, in which the Court protected the sensibilities of mainstream
Christianity’.45 She applauded the Chamber’s decision in Lautsi, since ‘[b]y refusing
to resolve a conflict between the religious majority and ideological/religious minorities on the basis of the doctrine of margin of appreciation, the European Court
finally embraced a veritably counter-majoritarian role.’46 She argued that this was
crucial since ‘domestic mechanisms may not always be able [to] perform such a task,
as the majority culture and sensibility often end up prevailing.’47 However, as we
know, such optimism was short lived.
After the Grand Chamber’s judgment in Lautsi, Andrea Pin deplored the Lautsi
Chamber decision, which was seen in Italy as ‘attacking the roots of Italian institutions and society’.48 He argued that ‘the pluralism that is allowed by the ECHR does
not contemplate not-impartial or not-neutral states.’49 ‘It endangers the very model
39 Zachary R Calo, ‘Pluralism, Secularism and the European Court of Human Rights’ (2010) 26 JL Religion
261, 268.
40 ibid 268.
41 ibid, quoting Richard John Neuhaus, ‘Secularization’ (2009) 190 First Things 24.
42 Calo (n 39) 271.
43 ibid 280.
44 Susanna Mancini, ‘The Crucifix Rage: Supranatural Constitutionalism Bumps Against the CounterMajoritarian Difficulty’ (2010) 6 ECL Rev 6, 23.
45 ibid.
46 ibid 25.
47 ibid.
48 Andrea Pin, ‘Public Schools, the Italian Crucifix, and the European Court of Human Rights: The Italian
Separation of Church and the State’ (2011) 25 Emory Int’l L Rev 95, 144.
49 ibid 147.
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The Court accordingly concludes [15-2] that there has been no violation of
Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 in respect of the first applicant. It further considers
that no separate issue arises under Article 9 of the Convention.
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4 . T H E S H A D O W OF W E S T P H A L I A
It is revealing to note that Article 9 cases after Kokkinakis continue to play a relatively
minor role in the jurisprudence of the court. In 2011, for example, although there
were a staggering 1,157 judgments rendered by the Court (875 by Chambers, 269
by Committees, and 13 by Grand Chambers), only five concerned Article 9.57 Two
years later it was much the same story: in 2013 only six Article 9 judgments out of
919 Strasbourg Court judgments.58 It is no wonder cases are few. What little the
court does decide concerning freedom of religion is unhappily inconsistent with the
values of Kokkinakis.
In Mouvement Raelien Suisse v Switzerland in 2012 a sharply divided (9-8) Grand
Chamber held that a Swiss canton’s prohibition of a poster campaign by an arguably
religious group, the Raeliens, was within the state’s Article 11 margin of appreciation.59 The movement’s founder, Claude Vorilhen (‘Raël’) claimed to be in contact
with extraterrestrials, the ‘Elohim’ who are claimed to have created life on earth and
principal religions, for example, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. The majority of the
court found the speech in question to be commercial, and hence less protected than
political speech under Article 10. The eight dissenting judges believed that it was
50 ibid.
51 ibid.
52 John Witte Jr and Nina-Louise Arold, ‘Lift High the Cross: Contrasting the New European and American
Cases on Religious Symbols on Government Property’ (2011) 25 Emory Int’l L Rev 5.
53 ibid 53.
54 ibid.
55 ibid 54.
56 European Dignity Watch, ‘European Court of Human Rights: Crucifixes in Public Schools Do not
Violate Freedom of Religion of Atheists’ <http://www.europeandignitywatch.org> (18 March 2011) accessed 7 January 2014.
57 Council of Europe (2012) 54 Yearbook of the European Court of Human Rights 2011 13, 48.
58 2013 Statistics <www.echr.coe.int> accessed 1 December 2014.
59 Mouvement Raelien Suisse v Switzerland, Application no 16354/06 (Grand Chamber, 13 July 2012).
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of the European state.’50 ‘[O]ne can question whether the established churches or
official religions of other European states could survive scrutiny if challenged under
the European Convention.’51
John Witte and Nina-Louise Arold applauded the Grand Chamber’s judgment
in Lautsi.52 In their view, the case showed that the Strasbourg Court accepted that
‘religious symbols often have redeeming cultural value.’53 Importantly, ‘the Court left
Italy to decide for itself how to balance the religious symbolism of the Catholic
majority and the religious freedom and education rights of its atheist minorities.’54
‘Religious freedom does not give a minority of hecklers a veto over majoritarian
policies.’55
In like manner, European Dignity Watch, an advocacy group, commended the
Grand Chamber for reversing the Chamber’s judgment in Lautsi. Their enthusiasm
sat comfortably under the shadow of Westphalia, a tradition of limited toleration of
internal dissenting views: ‘It is in the competence of each State, not the judges in
Strasbourg, to decide the basis of their political identity and how they should relate
to religious denominations.’56
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[T[here is little common ground amongst the member states of the Council of
Europe as to the question of the wearing of the full-face veil in public. The
Court thus observes that, contrary to the submission of one of the third party
interveners, there is no European consensus against a ban. Admittedly, from a
strictly normative standpoint it is very much in a minority position in Europe:
except for Belgium, no other member state of the Council of Europe has, to
date, opted for such a measure. It must be observed, however, that the question of the wearing of the full-face veil in public is or has been a subject of debate in a number of European states. In some it has been decided not to opt
for a blanket ban. In others, such a ban is still being considered. It should be
added that, in all likelihood, the question of the wearing of the full-face veil in
public is simply not an issue at all in a certain number of member states, where
this practice is uncommon. It can thus be said that in Europe there is no consensus as to whether or not there should be a blanket ban on the wearing of
the full-face veil in public places.

60 Eweida and Others v United Kingdom, Application nos 48420/10 and 59842/10 (15 January 2013).
61 SAS v France, Application no 43835/11(1 July 2014).
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‘difficult to accept that a lawful association with a website that has not been prohibited, should be prevented from promoting its ideas through posters that are not
unlawful in themselves’.
In Eweida and Others v the United Kingdom in 2013 a chamber of the court
reached apparently contrasting results about an individual’s right to manifest religion.60 It upheld the right of Ms Eweida to wear a cross at work on her British
Airways uniform. Contradicting the conclusion of the British courts, the Fourth
Section held that ‘Ms. Eweida’s cross was discreet and cannot have detracted from
her professional appearance.’ However, another complainant, Chaplin, who worked
as a nurse on a geriatric ward was not so protected by Article 9. ‘[T]he reason for
asking her to remove the cross, namely the protection of health and safety on a
hospital ward, was inherently of a greater magnitude than that which applied in
respect of Ms. Eweida.’ Another British applicant who lost her job was also not protected when, as a registrar, she refused to register same-sex unions which she
believed to be against the Christian faith. The court found her dismissal to be within
the UK’s Article 9 margin of appreciation, noting that the state ‘aimed to secure the
rights of others which are also protected under the Convention’. Similarly, the court
held against a counsellor who, working for a private company, refused to provide
psycho-sexual counselling services equally to heterosexual and homosexual couples,
also on Christian religious grounds. Again, the court noted ‘that the most important
factor to be taken into account is that the employer’s action was intended to secure
the implementation of its policy of providing a service without discrimination’.
In 2014, in SAS v France, the Grand Chamber ruled 15 to 2 that France should be
permitted to ban full-face veils on women in public places.61 Despite the fact that
only two of the Council of Europe’s 47 Member States banned full-face veils (the
other state being Belgium), the court concluded:
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[T]he respondent state has to a certain extent restricted the reach of pluralism,
since the ban prevents certain women from expressing their personality and
their beliefs by wearing the full-face veil in public. However, for their part, the
Government indicated that it was a question of responding to a practice that
the State deemed incompatible, in French society, with the ground rules of
social communication and more the requirements of ‘living together.’ From
that perspective, the respondent State is seeking to protect a principle of interaction between individuals which is in its view is essential for the expression
not only of pluralism, but also of tolerance and broadmindedness without
which there is no democratic society. It can thus be said that the question
whether or not it should be permitted to wear the full-face veil in public places
constitutes a choice of society.
The court in SAS kept to the permissiveness of Otto-Preminger, Murphy, and
Lautsi, and allowed the national majority to set rules limiting manifestation by adherents of minority religions. SAS makes clear its reliance on judicial deference following
from an application of the margin of appreciation:
[T]he Court has a duty to exercise a degree of restraint in its review of
Convention compliance, since such review will lead it to assess a balance that
has been struck by means of a democratic process within the society in question. [I]n matters of general policy, on which opinions within a democratic
society may reasonably differ widely, the role of the domestic policy-maker
should be given special weight.
In other words, France had a wide margin of appreciation in the present case.
What has gone wrong with the court and Article 9? Looking for an historical
answer, Yannis Ktistakis has argued that the founders of the Strasbourg system were
more concerned with constituting a political weapon of juxtaposition to the atheistic
proposal of Communists than in moderating ‘the peaceful coexistence of Christian
states’.62 Only after the fall of Communism in 1989, did the Court turn its attention
to ‘the rivalry of civilizations and religions.’63 Similarly, Nehal Bhuto stressed the centrality of ‘Jacques Maritain’s Christian personalist thought’, embodied in one of his

62 Yannis Ktiskakis, ‘The Protection of the forum integrum under Article 9 of the ECHR’, in Spielmann and
others (eds), The European Convention of Human Rights as a Living Instrument: Essays in Honour of
Christof L Rozakis 285, 286 Bruylant (2011).
63 ibid.
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With all due respect, the court doth protest too much. Repeating several times
words to the effect that ‘there is little common ground’, ‘no European consensus’, ‘simply not an issue’, and ‘there is no consensus’, does not make it so. Forty-five to two
seems to be a remarkable European consensus, no matter how much the court would
wish it away.
Rather than an absence of a European consensus, what seems at work in SAS is
the court’s reluctance to interfere in majoritarian attitudes to religion:

The Shadow of Westphalia



93

64 Bhuta (n 10) 6.
65 Nicolas Bratza, ‘The Precious Asset: Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human
Rights’ (2010) 14 Ecc LJ 256, 258.
66 ibid 257–58.
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follower’s condemnation of the denial of the ‘moral freedom to choose among
courses’ in Communist Russia, Fascist Spain, and ‘Moslem countries.’64
The President of the court, Nicolas Bratza of the UK, concluded that ‘[i]t is, of
course, impossible for the Court to provide an all-encompassing answer’ to the
challenges facing it over Article 9.65 He attributed the problem to the ‘very different
religions and cultural backgrounds’ of the 47 Member States and the Court’s ‘need
to respect very different constitutional traditions.’66
In my opinion, the court probably has gone as far as it wants to go given the
currents of modern European social, political, and cultural cohesion. This is, I think,
the continuing shadow of Westphalia. Now, as in 1648, Europe accepts that each
sovereign state is entitled to choose its own national approach to religion, including
a choice heavily weighted in favour of a majoritarian religion, officially established or
not. Moreover, the Strasbourg Court usually permits a state to protect its majoritarian confession from minority challenges. The protection is justified variously:
protecting the majority from mocking scornful criticism (Otto-Preminger), protecting
the state from divisive religious alternatives (Murphy), advancing a national cultural
identity (Lautsi), terming a religious manifestation ‘commercial’ (Mouvement
Raelien), protecting the rights of others (Eweida), or repecting a national social
choice (SAS). Modern Europe, still in its Westphalian shadow, promotes intraEuropean peace by permitting states to establish their own distinct national visions
of the role of religion in society. Protecting minority religious challenges to such
national visions is, despite Kokkinakis, usually a step too far out of the shadow of
Westphalia for the Strasbourg Court.

